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//-->Feminism & Psychologyhttp://fap.sagepub.com/Doing Feminist Conversation AnalysisCelia KitzingerFeminism & Psychology2000 10: 163DOI: 10.1177/0959353500010002001The online version of this article can be found at:http://fap.sagepub.com/content/10/2/163Published by:http://www.sagepublications.comAdditional services and information forFeminism & Psychologycan be found at:Email Alerts:http://fap.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsSubscriptions:http://fap.sagepub.com/subscriptionsReprints:http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navPermissions:http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navCitations:http://fap.sagepub.com/content/10/2/163.refs.html>>Version of Record- May 1, 2000What is This?Downloaded fromfap.sagepub.comby Anna Dom on October 14, 2012ARTICLESCelia KITZINGERDoing Feminist Conversation AnalysisThis article argues for, and offers empirical demonstration of, the value of conversationanalysis (CA) for feminist research. It counters three key criticisms of CA as anti-feminist:the alleged incompatibility of CA’s social theory with feminism; the purported difficulty ofreconciling analysts’ and participants’ concerns; and CA’s apparent obsession with theminutiae of talk rather than socio-political reality. It demonstrates the potential of CA foradvances in lesbian/feminist research through two examples: developing a feministapproach to date rape and sexual refusal; and an ongoing CA study of talk in whichpeople ‘come out’ as lesbian, gay, bisexual or as having (had) same-sex sexual experi-ences. These examples are used to illustrate that it is precisely the features of CA criticizedas anti-feminist which can be used productively in doing feminist conversation analysis.Key Words:coming out, conversation analysis, date rape, ethnomethodology, feminism,refusal, talk-in-interaction, turn-takingFeminism is a politics predicated on the belief that women are oppressed; a socialmovement dedicated to political change. Issues that have preoccupied feministsinclude violence against women, childhood sexual abuse and recovered memo-ries, acquaintance rape, sexual harassment, the beauty myth, compulsory hetero-sexuality, women’s health and reproductive rights, equal opportunities forwomen in the workplace and the end of heteropatriarchal domination.Conversation analysis (CA) is the academic study of talk-in-interaction, asidentified, in particular, with the works of its founder, Harvey Sacks, in conjunc-tion with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Issues that have preoccupiedconversation analysts include the projectability of turn constructional units, theonset of overlap in turn-taking organization, turn allocation techniques, thesyntax of sentences in progress, sequence organization, preference structures andself-correction in the organization of repair in conversation.It is, then, not immediately apparent, on the basis of the foregoing descriptionsof ‘feminism’ and ‘conversation analysis’, just what would be involved in ‘doingFeminism & Psychology© 2000 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi),Vol. 10(2): 163–193.[0959-3535(200005)10:2;163–193;012415]Downloaded fromfap.sagepub.comby Anna Dom on October 14, 2012164Feminism & Psychology 10(2)feminist conversation analysis’, and it is perhaps no surprise that some feministand critical psychologists (for example, Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999) haveexpressed considerable reservations about the value of CA for feminist work –even suggesting that feminism and CA are ‘oxymorons’ (Speer, 1999). In thisarticle, I write as a lesbian feminist who has used a range of other methodologies(including Q methodology, Kitzinger 1987, 1999; story completion, Kitzingerand Powell, 1995; and discourse analysis, Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 1995;Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995), and who sees in CA some exciting possibilitiesfor lesbian and feminist research.Of course, it is true that CA has not hitherto been notable for its contributionsto feminist or lesbian perspectives, but CA hardly stands out in this regard. Thecore texts on a whole range of other analytic approaches (including, for example,experimental design, psychoanalysis, survey technique, oral history, contentanalysis, ethnography, grounded theory, psychometric testing, repertory grids, Qmethodology) remain largely silent about feminist issues – and yet feminists havefound ways of adapting these powerful methods and using them for our ownpurposes. In the long history of debate about what constitute appropriate feministmethodologies, there is (so far) not one single methodology that feminists haveagreed has to be discarded as fundamentally incompatible with feminism (seeReinharz, 1992). The pattern has rather been that particular approaches (forexample, experimental, psychoanalytic or postmodern work) have becomeestablished without feminist involvement and consequently have been roundlycriticized as sexist by feminists who initially dismiss the entire approach (‘themaster’s tools will never demolish the master’s house’). Subsequently, otherfeminists workingwithinthose approaches have found imaginative and creativeways to address those feminist criticisms, to make gender and sexuality visibleand to use the master’s tools for feminist purposes – and the approach thenbecomes firmly established as a recognized and accepted way of ‘doing femi-nism’ in the academy. To those feminists who would discard CA as anti-feminist,then, I would urge caution, if for no other reason than simply on the basis of ourprior experience of rashly dismissing other approaches as fundamentally anti-feminist, and having later to ‘reclaim’ them for feminism.From the earliest development of CA in the 1970s, there has always been somefeminist interest in CA, and this interest has grown enormously in recent yearssince the publication of Sacks’s (1995)Lectures on Conversationand the wideravailability of resources on doing CA (Psathas, 1995; Hutchby and Wooffitt,1998; ten Have, 1999). It is unfortunate that Billig’s recent critique of CA, whichis framed in part as a chivalrous defence of feminism against the demonizedfigure of Schegloff, nowhere cites feminist involvement in CA or engages withfeminist claims that CA is of use to us. Not only does Billig overlook classicfeminist work drawing on CA, such as West and Zimmerman’s exploration ofinterruptions in cross-sex conversations (Zimmerman and West, 1975; West andZimmerman, 1977; West, 1979) and Goodwin’s (1990) analyses of girls’ talk, healso chooses to ignore the conversation analytic work being carried out by femi-Downloaded fromfap.sagepub.comby Anna Dom on October 14, 2012KITZINGER:Doing Feminist Conversation Analysis165nists based in his own department, and by others who have presented their workat Loughborough’s Discourse and Rhetoric Group, of which Billig is a foundingmember (for example, Frith, 1998; Frith and Kitzinger, 1998; Stokoe, 1998;Kitzinger and Frith, 1999; Speer, 1999, forthcoming). Moreover, in arguing thatCA incorporates into its basic premises ideas that are fundamentally antitheticalto feminist (and other critical) values, Billig’s article assumes a narrow andrestrictive model of feminism which is seriously at variance with (and rendersinvisible) the full range and variety of feminisms across the social sciences. Inresponding to Billig’s critique of CA, Schegloff (1999: 559) has taken him to taskfor various ‘misunderstandings or misreadings’ of CA: to that charge I would adda failure to appreciate the range of contemporary feminist theory around genderand sexuality.This article is not, however, intended as a direct response to Billig’s claims, butrather aims to address those of his concerns which strike me as being moregenerally shared, and which have often been raised (in conversation rather thanin print) in critical and feminist academic contexts by students and colleaguesapparently alarmed by my developing interest in CA over the past couple ofyears. These key criticisms are: (1) the extent to which CA’s underlying and oftenunarticulated social theory is compatible with feminism (or other criticalperspectives); (2) the difficulty of reconciling CA’s emphasis on ‘participants’orientations’ with the analyst’s own preoccupations with gender, class, sexualityand power when these are not apparently attended to by participants themselves;and (3) CA’s apparent obsession with the minute details of mundane everydaytalk, to the exclusion of broader social and political realities. Following atheoretical discussion of these three (overlapping) ‘troubles with CA’, I will offertwo concrete illustrations drawn from my own work of the value of CA within alesbian feminist perspective: the first uses CA to develop a feminist approach todate rape and sexual refusal; the second is drawn from an ongoing conversationanalytic study of talk in which people ‘come out’ as lesbian, gay, bisexual or ashaving (had) same-sex sexual experiences. My theoretical argument and mypractical examples converge in the claim that it is, ironically,precisely thosethree features of CA that are critiqued as anti-feminist which offer the most excit-ing potential for feminist-informed conversation analytic work.THE TROUBLE WITH CA IS . . .Conversation analysis is a relatively well-defined field: a core set of key practi-tioners (for example, Atkinson, Clayman, Drew, Goodwin, Heritage, Holt,Jefferson, Psathas, Sacks, Schegloff) are clearly visible, and their work definesthe centre of the field. By contrast, feminist and critical approaches are muchmore diffuse and heterogeneous, and even within the discipline of psychologyalone, there is no single agreed upon feminist (or critical) theory, methodology,epistemology or ontology: feminist work embraces the experimental and theDownloaded fromfap.sagepub.comby Anna Dom on October 14, 2012166Feminism & Psychology 10(2)experiential, the positivist and the postmodern (Wilkinson, 1996, 2000; Fox andPrilleltensky, 1997; Ibáñez and Iñiguez, 1997). This heterogeneity of feministand critical perspectives means that CA is open to attack on a bewildering arrayof contradictory points from critics of different persuasions. It is clearly not thecase that CA is (or can readily be made) compatible with all variants of feministresearch. As I will suggest below, it is not well suited to sex-differences research,to any kind of experimental or correlational paradigm, to work seeking to uncoverindividual affects or cognitions, or to use in structural-functionalist or essentialistfeminisms. All these approaches flourish under the rich variety of what consti-tutes feminist psychology today – and none is likely to find CA suited to theirpurposes. But feminist researchalsoincludes social constructionist, ethno-methodological, postmodern, radical lesbian and queer approaches to sexualityand gender – and for these feminists, as I will show, CA has much more to offer.Critics of CA sometimes seem to imagine that they can locate it in oppositionto some imagined monolithic ‘feminism’, which has one single politically correctline. In fact, it is striking that criticisms of CA are also very often equally applic-able as criticisms of particular kinds of feminisms. For example, both CA andethnomethodological feminisms are accused of lacking a proper appreciation ofsocial-structural forces that constrain and shape behaviour, and of focusingexcessively on the mundane and relatively ‘trivial’ aspects of our lives at theexpense of larger systems of institutionalized power and control; and both CAand postmodern feminism are accused of being dense and impenetrable, and ofmystifying ordinary people’s everyday experience with jargon-ridden prose. Myaim here is not to defend the ‘trivial’ or the ‘jargon-ridden’, but rather to con-textualize these criticisms of CA within the ongoing feminist debates. We needto replace a simplistic CA/feminism dichotomy with a more sophisticatedengagement withfeministdiscussions about the appropriate conceptualizations ofsocial structure and individual agency, the relationship of power to subjectiveunderstandings, and the role of the mundane ‘micro’ events of everyday life inrelation to oppression. In what follows, I have tried to lay out some of the ground-work for those discussions to take place.1. CA’s Social TheoryConversation analysis emerged in the context of, and embodies, many of theideas of ethnomethodology, the sociological theory developed by Garfinkel andhis collaborators in the 1960s (from which terms such as ‘member’ and ‘partici-pant’ derive). Garfinkel (1967) rejected the dominant sociological paradigm ofhis day, as articulated in the work of Talcott Parsons, which explained humanaction as the result of institutionalized systems of norms, rules and values whichare internalized by individuals. For Garfinkel, this approach portrays social actorsmerely as victims at the mercy of external social forces. For ethnomethodologists,social facts such as power and oppression areaccomplishments(Garfinkel,1967); instead of being already existing ‘things’, they are processes continuallyDownloaded fromfap.sagepub.comby Anna Dom on October 14, 2012 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]